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In this commentary on “Motor skill
depends on knowledge of facts” by Stanley
and Krakauer (2013) (henceforth, S&K)
we aim to sketch an apparent contradic-
tion in S&K’s argument on the dependence
of skills on knowledge of facts. We con-
tend that S&K’s plea for this dependence
stems from another form of indepen-
dence of knowledge and skills—namely
an “ontological” independence. We show
what this means by introducing the dif-
ference between theories that are hierar-
chically organized, where one level has
priority over another level, and theories
that do not assume such an organiza-
tion. We believe neuroscience and psy-
chology have a lot to gain by taking note
of these distinct attitudes, as they lead
to radically different directions of inquiry
and explanation. We shall show this by
explicating the attitudes throughout S&K’s
argument, as that will go toward resolving
the apparent contradiction.
In their thought provoking article S&K
call into question the generally accepted
view that skills are independent of knowl-
edge of facts. After sketching a historical
and philosophical context, S&K provide
clarification of often confusingly applied
notions as propositional or declarative
knowledge, perceptual acuity, and the
likes. The authors carefully argue against
giving necessary and sufficient conditions
for either skills or knowledge. To make
their claim against independence S&K
propose, to our delight, to look for knowl-
edge and skill within the situation in which
they are shown.
In making their claim, S&K seem to
draw an analytical distinction between
knowledge of facts and skills. As agents
always need to “know what to do to initi-
ate the actions that manifest a skill” (p. 5)
(1), S&K assert that skills cannot be said
to be independent of knowledge of facts.
Neuroscientific data too, such as those
from studying HM, are taken to show that
HM always needed “explicit” instructions
and needed to “use that knowledge each
time” (p. 8) in order to learn a skill. In
fact, because HM did not show his skills
without these instructions, he cannot be
properly said to have skill at all. Rather, he
has what S&K call “motor acuity.”
With this reasoning S&K however, do
not only argue against the independence
of knowledge and skill, they make the
stronger claim that knowledge is always
prior to skill. They assert that knowl-
edge is minimally a state with proposi-
tional content used for guiding actions
(p. 1). Together, knowledge thus, works
as a distinct state that first initiates and
subsequently guides motor acuity. As such
knowledge is treated as an isolated state
that, together with motor acuity, under-
lies skill. So although S&K claim knowl-
edge and skill should not be taken to be
independent, their account shows that the
dependence is a superficial one. That is,
S&K argue for physical dependence by cre-
ating ontological independence. Not only
are knowledge and skill thus, still inde-
pendent entities, ontologically knowledge
is even prioritized. It is this perspective
that prompts S&K’s conclusion that skills
depend on knowledge of facts.
Although we are sympathetic to the
claim that skills and knowledge of facts are
strongly dependent notions, it is this onto-
logical priority we aim to argue against
here. We will start with a brief correction
of S&K’s historical overview, as we believe
it both shows and propagates a misun-
derstanding at the heart of their view.
Subsequently, we will argue for a point that
S&K did not recognize, namely that the
tradition of Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein,
and Dreyfus was aimed at overcoming
exactly the tendency to find ontological
priorities. That is, for them knowledge
and skills stand on equal footing, rather
than the one underlying the other. Once
we showed this, S&K’s reading of these
philosophers is easily identified as inap-
propriate. On a proper reading the ques-
tion of (ontological) priority should not
come up. Finally, we assert that taking
Dreyfus seriously indeed makes a good
argument against the independence of
skills and knowledge of facts, and from this
perspective S&K’s re-interpretation of HM
and other neuroscientific data offer a new
look at neuroscientific literature. However,
we shall argue that this is not, as S&K sug-
gest, because we finally free neuroscience
from the influence of the “predominant”
20th century tradition. Rather, it is by
finally embracing such a tradition that
neuroscientific data can be seen afresh.
MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND
NEUROSCIENCE
Before moving on to our main argument,
it is worth pausing at one of the histori-
cal claims S&K made. They assert that the
anti-cognitivist view of Dreyfus, which fol-
lows the tradition of Merleau-Ponty and
Bourdieu (and we may add Heidegger and
Wittgenstein) is in fact the dominant view
in philosophy and the social sciences, and
that neuroscience mirrors this philosoph-
ical literature (p. 2). Their overview sug-
gests thus, that neuroscientific theorizing
is held hostage by an anti-cognitivist per-
spective that separates knowledge of facts
from skill and empirical studies in neu-
roscience do no more than mirror this
philosophical thesis.
This, we believe, is a false rendition
of the history of cognitive neuroscience
and its psychological and philosophical
antecedents. The dissociation of knowl-
edge of facts from skill in neuroscientific
literature echoes the distinction between
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(perception), cognition and action that
comes with the dominant computer
metaphor (of input, processing, and
output) of the 1960’s onward (see e.g.,
Posner and DiGirolamo, 2000; Hurley,
2002; Boden, 2006). The computationalist
view that cognition is the computational
manipulation of representations (e.g.,
Newell and Simon, 1976) in turn has
its roots in Cartesian philosophy of the
17th century that placed the mind in
a the mechanistic body (Boden, 2006).
This idea was propagated in philosophy,
and re-affirmed in psychology as thought
and action were made to fit the emerg-
ing psychophysical methods (through e.g.,
Wundt and Titchener), ending up with
cognition as an invisible internal state that
constructs percepts from incoming sen-
sations, and coordinates movements by
outgoing motor commands.
Notice how in this historical picture
theorizing is informed by a belief that for
understanding the mind, it makes sense
to look for underlying elements that cause
it. Direction of inquiry is thus, vertically
directed. For example, perception is made
up of underlying elementary sensations,
and skills are nothing but movements
guided by cognitive commands (what S&K
would call “knowledge of facts”). It is
exactly this analytical, intellectualist atti-
tude that Dreyfus, Merleau-Ponty, but also
Ryle and Wittgenstein, each in their own
way, aimed to displace. But their role
has thus, certainly never made the impact
on (cognitive) neuroscience S&K claimed
it does. To date it has been limited to
but a view prevailing non-representational
or non-computational approaches to psy-
chology (e.g., Gibson, 1979; Thelen et al.,
1994; Kelso, 1995; Reed, 1996; Chemero,
2009).
A HORIZONTAL APPROACH
So much for the groundwork, now on
to our main argument, because the view
S&K claim Dreyfus’ tradition holds is
itself also misguided. For this we find
it useful to distinguish two basic ways
of directing inquiry in philosophy (and
psychology). First, there is the attitude
that we just exemplified in the pre-
ceding section. It roughly conceives the
world to be composed of supervening
layers, e.g., going up from atoms to
cells to brains and minds. This is often
associated with reductionism (though it
need not be), internalism about men-
tal life, and with physicalism; conceiving
of cognitive states—like knowledge—as
something you have as a (physical, infor-
mational) state or process. Elsewhere, we
have called this approach to psychology
a “vertical worldview,” as it shows a ten-
dency to explain (empirical) phenom-
ena by analyzing downward to underlying
(and often hidden and abstract) essentials
(van Dijk and Withagen, 2014).
In contrast to a vertical worldview,
Wittgensteinian and Heideggerian tradi-
tions approach their subject more hori-
zontally. Metaphorically, this attitude does
not start out with a layered structure, and
phenomena are not relocated along a ver-
tical axis, but keeps to a horizontal plane.
That is, the attitude resists the urge to ana-
lyze beyond the phenomena in search for
essence, and locates both large and small
scale phenomena at the same level (van
Dijk andWithagen, 2014). This means that
understanding phenomenon requires see-
ing in what particular, concrete situations
it actually does or does not play a role.
To explain a phenomenon, such as knowl-
edge, a horizontal approach thus, looks at
the particular, concrete situation in which
it actually comes up, rather than treat-
ing all particular cases as similar and try-
ing to derive abstract underlying essences
from that (see also Wittgenstein, 1969,
§ 10).
Importantly, a horizontal approach
does not deny the reality of cognitive
states or any other aspect of human
life typically assigned to lower levels of
description. However, it does deny this re-
conceptualizing of knowledge as a state
below apparent behavior. So, for example,
Merleau-Ponty’s denial that skilled behav-
ior manifests cognitive states (p. 2) is not
a denial of experts having knowledge, but
a denial of the identification of cognition
(knowledge) with an underlying (guiding)
state. In short, much like S&K, the hor-
izontal approach aims to direct attention
to the concrete performances of skill in
particular situations to explain knowledge
of facts. However, the focus of inquiry
remains with these concrete performances
and does not subsequently analyze to an
ontological priority beneath it.
It is much more fruitful, we feel,
to also read Dreyfus’ work from this
horizontal perspective. In his phenomeno-
logical analysis of skill acquisition, Dreyfus
brings to view the fact that as one learns,
one grows into a concrete situation; getting
more in touch with the world, rather than
abstracting away from it by constructing
abstract rules (e.g., propositional knowl-
edge) to guide engagement. To Dreyfus,
skill acquisition is not a vertically directed
process of going from concrete sensorimo-
tor couplings (e.g., Piaget, 1954) upwards
and inwards to abstract generally applica-
ble rules. Rather, skill acquisition moves
horizontally from abstract instructions
(because they lack application) to con-
crete, highly adaptable, perceptual-motor
behavior.
Thus, from a horizontal approach
Dreyfus’ assertion that expertise does not
require unconscious rules should not be
read as a plea against experts having
knowledge, but against assigning knowl-
edge one level below concrete behavior to
a hidden state (with unconscious propo-
sitional content). That experts do not fall
back on explicit rules when performing
therefore, does not mean that they lack
knowledge or are not knowledgeable, in
fact, it shows that they have knowledge
galore. Interestingly, S&K argue basically
the same, however, they feel the urge
to subsequently suppose that having this
expert knowledge requires a hidden layer
of propositional content. Dreyfus’ hori-
zontal attitude, by contrast, resists such an
analytical abstraction away from the actual
phenomenon.
We believe that because S&K have given
an overly vertical reading of Dreyfus, their
argument misses the mark. Their rendi-
tion of the historical and ontological com-
mitment of Dreyfus’ tradition shows that
the authors might themselves be deeply
influenced by an intellectualist, vertical
approach to psychology and (cognitive)
neuroscience. Because of this S&K failed to
see how close to Dreyfus they actually get.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this short commentary we hope to
have shown the limits of S&K’s anal-
ysis of the relation between skills and
knowledge and its history in philosophy.
We did so by pointing to an ontologi-
cal distinction between vertical and hor-
izontal approaches to the subject. We
believe a study of skills, knowledge, and
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any other aspect of human behavior has
much to gain from considering a hori-
zontal approach. The horizontal view on
skill acquisition and the role of perceptual
and motor acuity has for example impor-
tant consequences for developing theo-
ries and hypotheses in motor control and
important implications for neuroscientific
research.
We believe that S&K have offered us
a compelling empirical argument against
the independence of skills and knowl-
edge and an important re-interpretation
of seminal neuroscientific literature. They
showed that both knowledge and skills
are aspects of one and the same world
of everyday life. But rather than dis-
missing Dreyfus’ tradition, we hope to
have shown that they ought to embrace
the tradition fully to make their claim
against independence. Maybe this will
inspire neuroscience to consider a hori-
zontal approach to their role in psychol-
ogy. This, we feel, would have mutually
beneficial effects for both psychology and
neuroscience.
NOTES
1. All page numbers refer to Stanley and
Krakauer (2013).
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